CRIMINAL
-RIGHT

LAW-PRE-INDICTMENT IDENTIFICATION CONFRONTATION
TO COUNSEL-State

v. Thomas, 107 N.J. Super. 128, 257

A.2d 377 (App. Div. 1969).
Defendant was taken into custody at the rear of an apartment
building where a woman just minutes before had been robbed of her
handbag. Within ninety minutes of the crime, the victim was taken
to a nearby police station where defendant, unaccompanied by counsel,
was individually presented in a pre-indictment identification confrontation.' After initial hesitation by the witness, defendant put on glasses
and the witness identified him saying, " 'Well, it is his stature and his
build and his height, and I hate to say it but I am sure.' ,,2 At the trial
the witness identified defendant by substantially the same language as
was used in the pre-trial confrontation.3
Defendant was convicted of robbery and appealed contending,
inter alia,4 that he had a constitutional right to counsel at the pre-trial
confrontation, and that absent such representation, any subsequent
testimony relating to an identification at such confrontation was inadmissible. 5 The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that a defendant
has no constitutional right to counsel at a pre-indictment confrontation
1 A pre-trial identification confrontation can take various forms such as "a lineup,
also known as an 'identification parade' or 'showup,' . . . or presentation of the suspect
alone to the witness ....
" But the same risks to the suspect are present in all of the
forms. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1967). An individual presentation of
a suspect, as in Thomas, is often called a "showup" as distinguished from a presentation
of a suspect in a group or line of persons which is normally called a "lineup."
2 State v. Thomas, 107 N.J. Super. 128, 131, 257 A.2d 377, 378 (App. Div. 1969).
3 The witness testified at the trial "that were it not for her observation of the defendant at police headquarters she would not have been able to identify him in court." Brief
for Defendant-Appellant at 10-11, State v. Thomas, 107 N.J. Super. 128, 257 A.2d 377.
4 Another contention of defendant was that the circumstances of the pre-trial confrontation were so suggestive as to deprive him of due process of law. The Appellate
Division rejected this contention and held "that the identification process employed was
not unreasonable or suggestive." 107 N.J. Super. at 133, 257 A.2d at 379. The defendant
also contended that the in-court identification should have been excluded since it was
tainted by the alleged illegal pre-trial confrontation. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at
12, State v. Thomas, 107 N.J. Super. 128, 257 A.2d 377. However, since the court decided
that the pre-trial confrontation was not illegal, it was unnecessary to decide this point.
5 Unless defendant objects at the trial to introduction of evidence relating to his
identification, either in-court or extra-judicially, he may not be permitted to raise this
issue on appeal for the first time. State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 453 P.2d 951 (1969);
People v. Davis, 270 Cal. App. 2d 928, 76 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1969); People
v. Armstrong, 268 Cal. App. 2d 341, 74 Cal. Rptr. 37 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1968); People v.
Rodriguez, 266 Cal. App. 2d 766, 72 Cal. Rptr. 310 (Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1968).
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for identification, where such confrontation occurred shortly after the
crime and shortly after defendant was taken into custody in the immediate vicinity of the crime, 6 even though in this case the identification was made in a police station.
In a series of recent opinions, the Supreme Court of the United
States has construed the sixth amendment guarantee of assistance of
counsel to apply to "critical" pre-trial stages of criminal proceedings
and not just to the trial itself.7 In Powell v. Alabama,8 the Court
enunciated the right to counsel during the period from arraignment
to trial. In Hamilton v. Alabama,9 that right was extended to those arraignments where certain rights or defenses of an accused might be
lost. Escobedo v. Illinois'° held that the right to counsel exists prior
to arraignment "where an investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect"" who is subjected to interrogation in police custody. The Court
has also ruled 12 that an individual who is subjected to custodial police
interrogation has the right to presence of counsel, either retained or
appointed, before and during any questioning, unless he intelligently
waives this right.
Recently, the Court considered the accused's right to counsel with
regard to another aspect of police investigation-pre-trial identifica13
tion. In its trilogy of "lineup" decisions-United States v. Wade,
1
4
Gilbert v. California and Stovall v. Dennol--the Court held that "a
post-indictment pretrial lineup at which the accused is exhibited to
6 107 N.J. Super. at 134-35, 257 A.2d at 380.
7 Annot., 18 L. Ed. 2d 1420 (1968). The applicability of the sixth amendment procedural rights to state prosecutions was settled in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
9 368 US. 52 (1961). Under Alabama law, the defense of insanity must be pleaded
and motions to quash the indictment based upon systematic exclusion of a particular
race of people from the grand jury must be made at the arraignment. Thus the Court
said that the arraignment in such jurisdiction was a critical stage in a criminal proceeding
at which an accused had a right to the presence of counsel. Id. at 53-54.
10 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
11 Annot., supra note 7, at 1428.
12 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
14 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
15 388 U.S. 293 (1967). Stovall concerned the question of legality of a pre-trial identification confrontation based upon denial of due process of law which "is a recognized
ground of attack upon a conviction independent of any right to counsel claim." Id. at 302.
Accord, Bowen v. State, 5 Md. App. 713, 249 A.2d 499 (Ct. Spec. App. 1969).
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identifying witnesses[' 6 l is a critical stage of the criminal prosecution"' 7
which entitles the accused to the aid of counsel.18
The conduct of a pre-trial identification confrontation in violation
of the accused's right to counsel makes such confrontation illegal and
affects the admissibility of later in-court identifications 9 by witnesses
who have had such confrontations. The prosecution must show that
the in-court identification is independent of the illegal lineup before
the in-court identification can be received.2 0 A per se exclusionary rule
2
applies with respect to the illegal extra-judicial confrontation itself. '
Although the holdings of Wade and Gilbert related only to postindictment lineups, the language of these decisions may be broad
16 Where the accused is known by the witness prior to the commission of the crime,
subsequent identifications of the accused by the witness to assure police that they have
arrested the right person do not fall within the identification confrontations covered by
Wade. In re McKelvin, 258 A.2d 452 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969); State v. Williams, 6 N.C. App.
14, 169 S.E.2d 231 (Ct. App. 1969).
17 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967).
18 The right to counsel under the Wade rules also applies to juvenile proceedings.
In re T., 1 Cal. App. 3d 344, 81 Cal. Rptr. 655 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1969); In re McKelvin,
258 A.2d 452 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
19 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3701 (1968). Tit. II § 3502 was designed to make the in-court identification of an accused
by an eyewitness admissable regardless of the legality of any earlier extra-judicial confrontation by such witness. This is to modify the holdings of Wade and Gilbert. 20 Am.
Jur. Proof of Facts 16 (Supp. 1969). But see United States v. Kinnard, 294 F. Supp. 286
(D.D.C. 1968), for an opinion that the language of this section of the Act cannot be
given a literal interpretation when prior extra-judicial identification confrontations have
occurred.
20 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240-41 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 US.
263, 272-73 (1967). The Court said in Wade that the proper test to be applied in determining the admissibility of an in-court identification following an illegal, extra-judicial identification was essentially the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine enunciated in Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The Wade Court said that the factors to be
considered include
the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any
discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant's actual
description, any identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification
by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant
on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup
identification.
388 U.S. at 241. After an illegal, pre-trial identification by photographs, an in-court
identification must be tested just as if a physical confrontation had occurred. People
v. Lawrence, 276 Cal. App. 2d 359, 81 Cal. Rptr. 91 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1969).
21 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240-41 (1967); accord, State v. Vaughn, 19
Ohio App. 2d 76, 249 N.E.2d 844 (Ct. App. 1969). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 468-69 (1966), which indicates that an analogous per se exclusionary rule also applies
to evidence obtained from interrogation of a defendant prior to the defendant specifically
being given the Miranda bundle of warnings, regardless of defendant's actual knowledge
of his rights or other factors indicating fairness.
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enough to include any pre-trial identification confrontation. 22 Thus,
there has been some predictable variation 23 among jurisdictions regarding the point in the criminal pre-trial proceedings at which the
right to assistance of counsel becomes applicable.
Decisions have ranged from holding that the Wade rules apply
only to post-indictment confrontations, 24 as was specifically the case in
Wade, to diverse variations of the rule 25 encompassing even the pretrial examination of photographs. 26 In light of these variations, State v.
22 388 U.S. at 227, 235-37. "The rule applies to any lineup . . . regardless of when
the identification occurs, in time or place, and whether before or after indictment or
information." Id. at 251 (dissenting opinion).
23 Black, The Supreme Court 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 180-81 (1967).
24 State v. Fields, 104 Ariz. 486, 455 P.2d 964 (1969); State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz.
380, 453 P.2d 951 (1969); People v. Palmer, 41 111. 2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969).
25 See Nelson v. Peyton, 415 F. 2d 1154 (4th Cir. 1969) (right to counsel begins when
accusatorial process begins); People v. Cruz, 415 F.2d 336 (9th Cir. 1969) (pre-indictment
lineup may require right to counsel); Mason v. United States, 414 F-2d 1176 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (right to counsel for identification confrontation at a preliminary hearing); Young
v. United States, 407 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1007 (1969) (no right
to counsel at a fresh, on-the-scene identification a few minutes after the crime); Rivers
v. United States, 400 F. 2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968) (right to counsel in most, if not all, confrontations after arrest); United States v. Davis, 399 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 987 (1968) (right to counsel does not attach as soon as suspicions are aroused);
United States v. Kinnard, 294 F. Supp. 286 (D.D.C. 1968) (right to counsel even at an
on-the-scene identification within 45 minutes of the crime); United States v. Wilson, 283
F. Supp. 914 (D.D.C. 1968) (right to counsel at stationhouse identification 2 days after the
crime but before indictment); Cox v. State, 219 So. 2d 762 (Fla. D. Ct. App. 1969) (right
to counsel applied to viewing of a video tape of the accused being booked which was
used in lieu of a lineup); Joyner v. State, 7 Md. App. 692, 257 A.2d 444 (Ct. Spec. App.
1969) (right to counsel may attach to pre-indictment as well as post-indictment identification confrontation); Watson v. State, 7 Md. App. 225, 255 A.2d 103 (Ct. Spec. App. 1969)
(right to counsel applies to pre-indictment as well as post-indictment lineups); Smith v.
State, 6 Md. App. 59, 250 A.2d 285 (Ct. Spec. App. 1969) (right to counsel applies to any
lineup, pre-indictment or post-indictment, not subject to meaningful later review); Bowen
v. State, 5 Md. App. 713, 249 A.2d 499 (Ct. Spec. App. 1969) (no right to counsel at an
identification confrontation at a preliminary hearing because the judicial atmosphere
eliminates likelihood of prejudice to defendant); Maiden v. State, - Nev. -, 442 P.2d
902 (1968) (no right to counsel at an identification confrontation before a grand jury);
State v. Griffin, 4 N.C. App. 397, 167 S.E.2d 28 (Ct. App. 1969) (no right to counsel at
lineup where defendant was not accused of the crime in question, nor was he even a
suspect, but was being used as a "filler" in a lineup); State v. Park, 18 Ohio App. 2d 76,
246 N.E.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1968) (right to counsel at any pretrial confrontation where the
absence of counsel might derogate from defendant's right to a fair trial).
Nev. -, 451 P.2d 704 (1969). But see United States v.
26 Thompson v. State, Collins, 416 F2d 696 (4th Cir. 1969) (no right to counsel at photograph viewing in absence
of showing of unfairness. Dissenting opinion, however, said that there was a right to
counsel at such viewing.); United States v. Conway, 415 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1969); United
States v. Bennett, 409 F2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969); McGee v. United States, 402 F.2d 434 (10th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969); People v. Lawrence, 276 Cal. App. 2d 359, 81
Cal. Rptr. 91 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1969); Thompson v. State, 6 Md. App. 50, 250 A.2d 304
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Thomas is another link in the case-by-case development 27 of the application of the Wade rules.
Thomas is a case of first impression 28 in New Jersey concerning
the right to counsel at a pre-trial identification confrontation to which
Wade and Gilbert apply. 29 The earlier case of State v. Satterfield °
appears inapposite as controlling precedent because at the time of the
confrontation there in question there was no specific complaint to the
police.
There have, however, been a limited number of cases factually
3
comparable to Thomas in other jurisdictions. In Smith v. State, 1 it
was held that there was no right to counsel in an identification confrontation at a police station, approximately 2V hours after a robbery,
when the confrontation was not staged by the police but was, in fact,
a "happenstance" confrontation. In State v. Bratten,3 2 the witness, who
had been robbed approximately five hours earlier, was called to the
scene of an automobile accident by police to confront the suspects. The
court held that in such a confrontation, away from a police station and
"shortly" after the crime, the chance for misidentification was slight
and thus the right to counsel did not apply. However, the court said
33
that such cases require a case-by-case scrutiny.
In Commonwealth v. Bumpus,3

4

police officers arrived at the

scene of a crime within ten minutes of its commission. Within thirty
minutes, they apprehended defendant in the vicinity, relying on a
description given by the witness. The court held that the identification by the witness when defendant was returned to the scene was
(Ct. Spec. App. 1969); State v. Keel, 5 N.C. App. 330, 168 S.E.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1969) (defendant was previously known by the witness).
27 For a view that a case-by-case development of Wade is not desirable see United
States v. Kinnard, 294 F. Supp. 286, 289 (D.D.C. 1968).
28 Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 15, State v. Thomas, 107 N.J. Super. 128, 257 A.2d
377. The unreported case of State v. Palmer, Docket No. A-941-67 (decided February 17,
1969) involved a question of due process in the pre-trial confrontation. Brief for StateAppellee at 12-13, State v. Thomas, 107 N.J. Super. 128, 257 A.2d 377. The earlier reported
cases of State v. Matlack, 49 N.J. 491, 231 A.2d 369 (1967); State v. Hodgson, 44 N.J. 151,
207 A.2d 542 (1965); and State v. Woodard, 102 N.J. Super. 419, 246 A.2d 130 (App. Div.
1968), involved confrontations before the effective date of Wade.
29 Under Stovall, the holdings of Wade and Gilbert were given prospective application only for identification confrontations conducted after June 12, 1967. 388 U.S. at 296.
30 103 N.J. Super. 291, 247 A.2d 144 (App. Div. 1968).
31 6 Md. App. 23, 249 A.2d 732 (Ct. Spec. App. 1969). See also State v. Gatling, 5
N.C. App. 536, 169 S.E.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1969).
32 245 A.2d 556 (Del. Super. Ct. 1968).
33 Id. at 558.
34 354 Mass. 494, 238 N.E.2d 343 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1034 (1969).
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reasonable, and that the events "were substantially continuous";3"
hence, there was no right to counsel. In State v. Boens,3 6 defendant,
apprehended within fifteen minutes of a robbery attempt, was "voluntarily" returned to the scene of the crime for a confrontation with
the witness. The court held that this "on-the-scene" identification was
not such a critical stage as required the right to counsel. Similarly,
People v. Colgain37 held that defendant had no right to counsel at an
"in-the-field" identification occurring at the scene of an automobile
accident within five or six blocks of a robbery and within minutes of
its commission. The court said that where defendant was "apprehended
so close in proximity to the time and place of the crime itself, the
exigencies of the situation and over-riding public policy . . . [made]
it neither practical nor necessary to afford counsel .... ,,11
A different position was taken in People v. Martin.39 In Martin,
defendant, fitting the description of a suspect in a robbery occurring
11/2 hours earlier, was taken to a police station for identification after
a car in which he was a passenger was stopped. The court held that the
"dangers inherent in a 'compelled confrontation' were present" 40 even
though the confrontation occurred shortly after the robbery and defendant was not under formal arrest. However, since it was not clear
whether the apprehension was in the immediate vicinity of the crime,
defendant was entitled to counsel.
Federal courts which have considered the issue of right to counsel
at "on-the-scene" identification are in conflict. In Russell v. United
States,41 the witness reported a housebreaking to police within three
or four minutes of its occurrence and furnished a description of the
suspect. Defendant was picked up in the vicinity shortly thereafter and
returned to the scene for identification. In holding that no right to
counsel existed at such a confrontation, the court said that such prompt
confrontations present "substantial countervailing policy considerations" against the requirement for counsel by assuring reliability and
promoting the expeditious release of innocents. 42 Russell cautioned,
35 Id. at -,

238 N.E.2d at 344-45.

36 8 Ariz. App. 110, 443 P.2d 925 (Ct. App. 1968). See also People v. Moore, 104 I.

App. 2d 343, 244 N.E.2d 337 (App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1968).
37 276 Cal. App. 2d 147, 80 Cal. Rptr. 659 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1969).
38 Id. at -, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
39 273 Cal. App. 2d 724, 78 Cal. Rptr. 552 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1969).
78 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
40 Id. at -,
41 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 US. 928 (1969).
42 The court stated that
[t]his conclusion [the admissibility of the defendant's identification] does not
rest on a determination that McCann's [witness's] identification was in fact espe-
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however, that its holding applied only to "those on-the-scene identifications which occur within minutes of the witnessed crime. '43 Contrarily,
the court in United States v. Clark,44 observed that the immediacy of
the confrontation was not the controlling factor in determining the
right to counsel. 45 However, it is doubtful that the confrontation in
Clark could reasonably be considered as an "on-the-scene" confrontation inasmuch as nearly seven hours had elapsed between the crime
and the confrontation in question.
Although Thomas finds support in other jurisdictions and appears
to be the desirable position, the opinion does not adequately support
the holding. Thomas is considerably weakened by the court's heavy
reliance on People v. Palmer,46 which involved an identification confrontation more than two weeks after the commission of the crime. This
can hardly be called an "on-the-scene" confrontation. Palmer held that
the Wade rules "apply only to post-indictment confrontations, ' 47 a
position that the court in Thomas did not accept, even in its dicta. In
Thomas, the court said that "[w]e do not suggest that the right to
counsel cannot exist in pre-indictment identification proceedings .. .
nor do we hold that the right to counsel applies only to post-indictment
proceedings. '4 The Thomas court also cited Trask v. State49 as sup-

porting its position. However, the confrontation in Trask was before
the effective date of Wade and Gilbert and the court's comment regarding the accused's right to counsel at a pre-indictment lineup was dictum.
Thomas should have relied more heavily on Russell, because its reasoning appears to be the most logical approach to the problems encountered
in applying the Wade rules.50
cially reliable. It rests instead on a general rule that it is not improper for the
police immediately to return a freshly apprehended suspect to the scene of the
crime for identification by one who has seen the culprit minutes before.
Id. at 1284 (emphasis added).
43 Id. at 1284 n.20. Russell substantially overrules the specific holding, if not the
personal opinion of the presiding judge, in Kinnard, in which the court reluctantly held
that the right to counsel existed at an "on-the-scene" identification occurring forty-five
minutes after the commission of the crime.
44 289 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
45 The court stated that "[t]he significant characteristic shared by the confrontations
there [in Wade and Gilbert], i.e. a live confrontation between witnesses and the defendant,
is shared as well .. .here .. " Id. at 625 (emphasis added).
46 41 Ill. 2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969).
47 Id. at 572, 244 N.E.2d at 174.
48 107 N.J. Super. at 135, 257 A. 2d at 380.
49 247 A.2d 114 (Me. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1968).
50 Thomas lists Russell as supporting its position, but no reliance on the reasoning
of Russell appears to be made. 107 N.J. Super. at 134, 257 A.2d at 380. However, the
prosecution did rely extensively on Russell in its brief. Brief for State-Appellee at 13-15,
State v. Thomas, 107 N.J. Super. 128, 257 A.2d 377.
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It is unlikely that the Supreme Court intended Wade and Gilbert
to apply only to post-indictment confrontations. The test of "criticality"
utilized by the Court in these cases is a functional test rather than a
test based on specific, well-defined steps in the criminal proceeding.
The right to counsel applies "whenever necessary to assure a meaningful
'defence' "51 and a critical stage is "any stage of the prosecution, formal
or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate
from the accused's right to a fair trial." 52 If the formality of arrest,
arraignment, or indictment were required to make the right to counsel
applicable, the accused's rights could easily be circumvented by delaying
such formality. 53 The language of Wade "leaves room for the modifica'54
tion of the Wade rule in cases involving prompt confrontations.
The Court in Wade indicates that consideration might be given to
"substantial countervailing policy considerations," or situations where
notice to counsel might prejudicially delay the confrontation. 5
There appear to be "substantial countervailing policy considerations" in what amount to "on-the-scene" identification confrontations.
Such confrontations promote fairness of identification procedures by
assuring reliability and providing for the expeditious release of innocents. 56 The daily routine of police work needs more flexibility than
could be allowed by a strict application of the Wade rules to "on-thescene" confrontations. 57 "On-the-scene" confrontations, "dictated by the
exigencies of the immediate situation, serve a salutary purpose" and no
one should be "entitled to suppress any evidence so obtained." 58 Furthermore, "the rights of a suspect are subject to limitations arising out
of society's interest in police activity ...

"59

The Court in Wade indicated that the right to counsel did not
extend to all police activity, "such as systematized or scientific analyzing
of the accused's fingerprints, blood sample, clothing, hair, and the
51 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225 (1967).
52 Id. at 226.
53 People v. Furnish, 63 Cal. 2d 511, 516, 407 P.2d 299, 302-03, 47 Cal. Rptr. 387,
390-91 (1965).
54 Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S.

928 (1969).
55 388 U.S. at 237.
56 Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280, 1283-84 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 928 (1969).
57 United States v. Kinnard, 294 F. Supp. 286, 289 (D.D.C. 1968).
58 State v. Boens, 8 Ariz. App. 110, 114, 443 P.2d 925, 929 (Ct. App. 1968); accord,
People v. Colgain, 276 Cal. App. 2d 147, 80 Cal. Rptr. 659 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1969).
59 Wise v. United States, 383 F.2d 206, 209 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 964 (1968).
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like." 60 Prompt, "on the scene" confrontations offer "countervailing
policy considerations" as substantial as those offered by other activities
which are exempt from the right to counsel. Until the Supreme Court
provides more specific guidelines regarding the application of the
Wade rules to "on-the-scene" confrontations, 6 ' courts should remain
flexible and should consider such cases on a case-by-case basis. Such
factors as the immediacy of the confrontation to the crime, 62 the relative
location of the apprehension to the crime scene, 63 the adequacy of the
description of the suspect given by the witness prior to the apprehension, 64 the surroundings of the confrontation locale, 65 and whether the
confrontation was arranged by the police or was in fact a "happenstance" confrontation, 6 should be considered to determine the reasonableness 6 7 and fairness68 of the confrontation. Such case-by-case consideration is analagous to the consideration given to the admissibility
of an in-court identification following an illegal, extra-judicial confrontation. 69 This method of analysis will provide the type of review
required to prevent the derogation from a fair trial with which the
70
Court in Wade was concerned.
Thomas has at least marked a desirable outer limit to the application of the Wade rules to pre-trial identification confrontations.
Yet, Thomas has properly maintained a flexible attitude toward the
application of the Wade rules, which will permit the suggested case-bycase consideration of future cases. In the face of the uncertainity regarding the coverage of Wade and Gilbert, this seems the most reasonable approach.
60

388 U.S. at 227.

It is not known if a case involving this issue is now pending before the Court.
Certiorari was denied in Young, Russell and Davis, each of which held that there was no
right to counsel in an "on-the-scene" identification confrontation. This may at least be
an indication that the Court felt that the reasoning in these cases was appropriate.
62 People v. Colgain, 276 Cal. App. 2d 147, 80 Cal. Rptr. 659 (Ct. App. 4th Dist.
1969). See Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Bates v. United States,
405 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Commonwealth v. Bumpus, 354 Mass. 494, 238 N.E.2d 343
(1968). But see United States v. Clark, 289 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
63 People v. Colgain, 276 Cal. App. 2d 147, 80 Cal. Rptr. 659 (Ct. App. 4th Dist.
1969). See Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Commonwealth v.
Bumpus, 354 Mass. 494, 238 N.E.2d 343 (1968).
64 Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Commonwealth v. Bumpus,
354 Mass. 494, 238 N.E.2d 343 (1968).
65 State v. Bratten, 245 A.2d 556 (Del. Super. Ct. 1968).
66 Smith v. State, 6 Md. App. 23, 249 A.2d 732 (Ct. Spec. App. 1969).
67 Commonwealth v. Bumpus, 354 Mass. 494, 238 N.E.2d 343 (1968).
68 Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
69 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
70 See Tyler v. State, 5 Md. App. 265, 246 A.2d 634 (Ct. Spec. App. 1968).
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